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1. In troduction 
W hether we call the involvement ofinternational forces in Afghanistan as-sistance to the Afghan government or a peace operation, a stability oper-
ation, part afthe "war on terror," an armed conflict, a fo reign occupation or a love 
affair, and whatever the legal basis of such involvement may be, two of the most 
important tactical and humanitarian issues confronting international forces are 
when they may attack or detain an "enemy." Concerning detention, the key issues 
are on what legal basis and according to what procedure the decision to arrest and 
detain may be taken. Two branches of international law govern attack and deten-
tion: international humanitarian law (IH L) (or the law of anned conflict) and in-
ternational human rights law (tHRL). For both branches, first, a question of 
applicability arises: IHRL applies in every circwnstance and to everyone, but are 
the armed forces of States boun d by l HRL when acting outside their national terri-
tories? As for IHL, it certainly applies to armed forces acting extraterritorially, but 
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it applies only to armed conflicts and its rules on the issues of attack and detention 
are probably different in international and non-international armed conflicts. Sec-
ond. when applicable. for both IHL and IHRL the question arises as to when they 
allow (or rather. do not prohibit) international forces to deprive enemies oftheir 
life or their liberty. Third. ifboth branches apply and lead to differing results on the 
two issues. we must determine which of the two prevails. 
In this article. I will try to discuss these three questions. putting the emphasis on 
the substance of the rules. as others in this volwne have extensively discussed the 
classification of the conflict(s) in Afghanistan under IHL. 
When I refer to the "enemies" who mayor may not be attacked or detained un-
der the rules to be discussed, I will call them "fighters." Who may be attacked or de-
tained for what reasons is obviously one of the questions with which the legal 
framework must deal; even if the answer to that legal question were clear, one of 
the greatest practical difficulties would remain: to identify whether someone be-
longs to those categories. However, this article does not deal with thieves. with 
harmless civilians who may become incidental victims of attacks or are mistakenly 
targeted. or with civilians who oppose the government or the international pres-
ence without using force. These people are obviously covered by the rules to be ex-
plored. but they are not the hard cases and IHL and IHRL do not prescribe differing 
rules on them. The same is true for attacks directed against people who actually at-
tack international forces while they are engaged in such attacks. The difficult cases. 
with regard to the legality of attacks and the legal basis for their detention. are per-
sons whom international fo rces believe to be members of armed groups. such as AI 
Qaeda and the Taliban. I will explain why I consider that mere membership in such 
groups is not sufficient, but that the person must also have a fighting function to be 
a legitimate target of attack. l 
II. Applicability of IHL to the Situation in Afghanistan 
It is uncontroversial that in 2008 the level of violence and the degree of organiza-
tion of the Taliban and, at least in Afghanistan. of AI Qaeda are sufficiently high to 
make IHL applicable. even if the higher requirements of intensity and organization 
of the parties of IHL of non-international armed conflicts are appJied.2 The United 
States agrees, indeed, that the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan govern-
ment is not of an international character and that this characterization is not al-
tered by the fact that the latter is heavily supported (if not kept alive) by 
international forces. The only construction under which the entire confli ct in Af-
ghanistancould still (in 2008) be claimed to be of an international character would 
be to recall that the conflict was indeed international in 200 1 because it was fought 
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between the United States and the Taliban (who constituted the de facto govern-
ment of Afghanistan) and to consider that this conflict contin ues until the defeat of 
the Taliban. Most, including the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(JCRC), consider that the international conflict turned into a conflict not of an in-
ternational character in 2002 when the Karzai government was first appointed by 
the Loya Jirga3 and then elected (since this new government of Afghanistan re-
quested the foreign forces to support its continuing fight against the Taliban). For-
mally, however, one could consider that, until the Taliban are completely defeated, 
the conflict between the United States and the Taliban maintains its international 
character and the United States (or the UN Security Council) could not have al-
tered this classification by establishing, recognizing or concluding agreements with 
a new local government in the territory it occupied following its invasion .4 How-
ever, this is certainly not the thesis of the United States and it encounters different 
legal problems, inter alia, that it is difficult to consider free elections a change intro-
duced by the occupying power, that the UN Security Council has given its blessing 
to the new arrangements and that UN Security Council resolutions prevail over 
any other international obligation under Article 103 of the UN Charter. 
The United States argues, however, that beside the non-international armed 
conflict against the Taliban, a separate international anned conflict exists: the "war 
on terror" against AI Qaeda and its associates. 
As far as treaty law is concerned, international armed conflicts are mainly gov-
erned by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol l.s Neither the United 
States nor Afghanistan is a party to Protocol I, but they are bound by the many 
rules of the latter that correspond to customary international law. The Geneva 
Conventions apply to international armed conflicts. Common Article 2 to the 
Conventions states that they "shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties." Only States can be parties to the Conventions. AI Qaeda is not a State. 
Therefore, the Conventions do not apply to a conflict between the United States 
and its allies, on the one hand, and this non-State actor, on the other hand. As for 
customary international law, there is no indication confirming what seems to be 
the view of the US administration, i.e., that the concept of international armed 
conflict under customary international law is broader.6 State practice and opinio 
juris do not apply the law of international anned conflict to conflicts between 
States and certain non-State actors. On the contrary, and in conformity with the 
tenets of the Westphalian system, States have always distinguished between con-
flicts against one another, to which the whole ofIHL applied, and other armed con-
flicts, to which they were never prepared to apply those same rules, but only more 
limited humanitarian rules. 
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III. The Applicability of International Human Rights Law 
1. Does International Human Rights Law Apply Extraterritorially? 
International forces in Afghanistan do not act in their own territories. They are 
therefore bound by IHRL only if its obligations bind a State even when acting be-
yond that State's territoI)'. Article 1 of both the American Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) dearly state that 
the State parties must secure the rights listed in those Conventions to everyone 
within their jurisdictions. Under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) this includes an occupied territory.1 
On the universal level, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) a party undertakes "to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized ... " (my em-
phasis). This wording and the negotiating history lean toward understanding terri-
tOI)' and jurisdiction as cumulative conditions.8 The United States and Israel 
therefore deny that the Covenant is applicable extraterritorially,9 The International 
Court of lust ice (lCJ),IOthe UN Human Rights Committee ll and other Statesll are 
however of the opinion that the Covenant equally applies in an occupied terri-
tory. n From a teleological point of view it would indeed be astonishing that per-
sons whose rights can neither be violated nor protected by the territorial State lose 
any protection of their fundamental rights against the State who can actually vio-
late and protect their rights. 
2. How Much Contrai ls Necessary to Be under the Jurisdiction of a Foreign 
State? 
IfIHRL applies extraterritorially, the next question that arises is when a person can 
be considered to be under the jurisdiction of a State. Analysis of this issue-the 
level of control a State must exercise in order to be bound by its international hu-
man rights obligations-has often been divided according to treaty. However, 
there has been a certain amount of convergence in the interpretation of jurisdic-
tion in recent cases.l~ The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have tended to adopt broad views of 
what may give rise to a State having extraterritorial jurisdiction. The widely cited 
case of Alejandre v. Cuba illustrates that physical control over territory exercised 
through having "boots on the ground" is not necessary for jurisdiction to arise in 
the Inter-American system. In that case, the Commission held that the applicants 
came within Cuban jurisdiction when Cuba's airplanes fired on another airplane 
flying in international airspace. IS 
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As for the European Court of Human Rights, from its strictest test articulated in 
Bankovic-that a State must exercise effective control over territory by being phys-
ically present on that territory in order to have jurisdiction l6-the ECtHR has 
moved, over the past decade, to applying a standard that does not always require 
"boots on the ground." In Issa, the ECtHR looked for effective territorial control. It 
found, on the facts, that Turkish forces in northern Iraq did not exhibit that level of 
control and therefore, in its decision on the merits, held that in fact the Iraqi appli-
cants' claim was inadmissible. I? In a very recent case, however, the ECtHR has held 
that jurisdiction can flow from facts not unlike those in Alejandre v. Cuba (or in-
deed, in Bankovic). Pad v. Turkey involved a skirmish on the Turkish-Iranian bor-
der in which seven Iranians were killed by Turkish helicopter gunships. The Court 
held that 
it is not required to determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the 
Government had already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had 
caused the killing of the applicants' relatives .... Accordingly, the Court finds that the 
victims of the impugned events were within the jurisdiction of Turkey at the material 
time. HI 
This conclusion is clearly at variance with Bankovic, where, as one commentator 
put it, "the Court found that jurisdiction could not arise by the mere fac t of drop-
ping bombs on individuals."19 It would be specious if, in the future, the Court were 
to distinguish Pad exclusively on the grounds that Turkey had not fo rmally con-
tested that it had jurisdiction over the applicants' relatives. 
Conceivably, for all treaties, jurisdiction could arise through a State's extraterri-
torial exercise of control over persons. However, it seems likely that courts will at 
times also look for effective control over territory. The factors identified by the 
ECtHR in lssa as indicators of such control were (1) the number of soldiers on the 
ground, (2) the size of the area controlled, (3) the degree of control exercised (i.e., 
whether checkpoints, etc. Were established) and (4) the duration of the exercise of 
control. 2(1 The first and third facto rs are valid indicators to measure something as 
nebulous as "control"; however, with all due respect to the Court, the second and 
fourth factors bring little to the analysis. All other things being equal, it is difficult 
to imagine why it would make a difference whether foreign forces controlled a vast 
area or only a village. The fourth facto r, the duration of control, may be helpful for 
a Court reviewing actions long after the fac t, but it fa ils to provide States and their 
forces or agents with a clear indication of when they begin to be responsible for re-
specting (and possibly even protecting) the human rights of the people in their 
care. 
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In my view, a solution could be found through a functional approach, distin-
guishing the degree of control necessary according to the right to be protected.2 ! 
Such an approach would reconcile the object and purpose of human rights to pro-
tect everyone with the need not to bind States by guarantees they cannot deliver 
outside their territories and the protection of the sovereignty of the territorial State 
(which may be encroached upon by international forces protecting human rights 
against anyone other than themselves). For our two issues, this functional ap-
proach would mean that international forces have to respect the right to life of a 
person simply by omitting to attack that person as soon as those forces could affect 
that right by their attack, while they would have to respect the procedural guaran-
tees inherent in the right to personal freedom only as long as they physically detain 
the person. The applicability of IHRL obviously does not yet detennine whether its 
guarantees or those of IHl prevail in a given situation. All on the contrary, the lex 
specia/is issue only arises ifboth branches apply to a certain situation. 
3. What If Jurisdiction Is Shared by Different Coalition Partners and a Host 
Government? 
IfIHRL applies extraterritorially, even if we knew exactly what degree of control is 
necessary to put someone under the jurisdiction of a State, in the case of coalition 
operations such as those in Afghanistan additional questions arise. Can the degree 
of control necessary to exercise jurisdiction result from cumulative contributions 
by different States, including the host State? In such a case, does every contributing 
State have jurisdiction? These questions have been raised but not exhaustively ex-
amined before the ECtHR. In Hussein v. Albania et aI., the Court hcid that the ap-
plicant, Saddam Hussein, had failed to furnish sufficient proof that the respondent 
States had control over Iraq or over him at the time of his detention (or arrest) 
from which jurisdiction would lloW.22 The Court seemed to suggest that jurisdic-
tion would not automatically exist fo r States participating in a "coalition with the 
US, when the impugned actions were carried out by the US, when security in the 
zone in which those actions took place was assigned to the US and when the overall 
command of the coalition was vested in the US."23 Given the last-mentioned 
specificities, there is no prima facie reason to exclude that collective control could 
suffice to establish jurisdiction. A case that provides more guidance on this issue is 
Hess v. United Kingdom, which dealt with an application by Rudolph Hess' wife for 
his release from Spandau Prison. At the relevant time, the prison was under the 
control of the four Allied powers in Germany following the Second World War. 
The European Commission on Human Rights, in determining whether the prison 
came within the UK's jurisdiction, accepted a priori the premise that the ECHR 
could apply to the activities of British forces in Berlin. However, it took into 
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account the fact that decision-making power regarding the pr ison was by unani-
mous agreement between all four Allied powers. As such, it held that: 
.. the United Kingdom acts onlyas a partner in the joint responsibility which it shares 
with the three other Powers. The Commission is of the opinion that the joint authority 
cannot be divided into four separate jurisdictions and that therefore the United 
Kingdom's participation in the exercise of the joint authority and consequently in the 
administration and supervision of Spandau Prison is not a matter "within the 
jurisdiction" of the United Kingdom, within the meaning of Art. 1 of the 
Convention.24 
This holding would seem to exclude the possibility of jurisdiction flowing from 
collective control during a multilateral operation. However, as one author has ob-
selVed, the Commission was particularly troubled by the lack of executive decision-
making power of the UK in regard to the prison.25 Logically, if a State participating 
in a multilateral operation nevertheless retains executive decision-making power 
over its forces and personnel. there is no reason to deny jurisdiction. 
Moreover, any agreement between States participating in a multilateral opera-
tion affecting that kind of decision-making power could run afoul of a State's obli-
gations. In Hess, the Commission wrote: 
The conclusion by the respondent Government of an agreement concerning Spandau 
prison of the kind in question in this case could raise an issue Imder the Convention ifit 
were entered into when the Convention was already in fo rce for the respondent 
Government. The agreement concerning the prison, however, came into force in 
1945.26 
On the two issues dealt with in this article. I conclude as follows. No contribut-
ing State may make a deliberate causal contribution to a violation of the right to life 
of any person. However, a contributing State that is not an occupying power does 
not exercise the level of jurisdiction over a person that would oblige it to protect 
that person's right to life against other coalition partners or the host StateP Ap-
plying this reasoning to Afghanistan, the coalition and the Afghan authorities col-
lectively exercise effective control, but, for the international coalition partners, this 
does not give rise to the positive obligations associated with the right to life (Le .• to 
protect it against third parties). The responsibility for ensuring the respect of that 
aspect of the right to life remains with the Afghan government. which. to give effect 
to it, may have a due diligence obligation regarding the conduct of coalition forces. 
As for detainees, even a State which is not an occupying power must offer any per-
son it actually detains. independently of whether it also arrested that person or 
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not,28 the rights that detainee has during that phase of detention; however, such 
rights may also be respected by measures actually taken by another coalition part-
ner or the host State. 
In my view, the same analysis must be made when different coalit ion partners 
and a host State are bound by differing treaty obligations. Every State has to comply 
with its own obligations concerning its own contribution. In addition, a State actu-
ally detaining a person must protect the rights of that person even against States 
not bound to grant such rights. 
4. Who Could Proceed to Admissible Derogations? 
Under normal circumstances, a State's ab ility to derogate from its obligations un-
der human rights treaties is limited to situations in which the securi ty of the State 
itself is in jeopardy.29 Can this requirement be met when a State's forces are in-
volved in a mwtilateral operation abroad? Lord Bingham of Cornhill wrote in Al-
Jedda that the power to derogate 
may only be exercised in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation seeking to derogate, and only then to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation . ... It is hard to think that these conditions could ever be met 
when a state had chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation, however 
dangerous the conditions, from which it could withdraw.:lO 
Lord Bingham went on to add: "The Secretary of State does not contend that the 
UK could exercise its power to derogate in Iraq (al though he does not accept that it 
cowd not)."31 
In my view, one cannot simultaneously hold a State accoun table because it has a 
certain level of control abroad and deny it the possibility to derogate because there 
is no emergency on that State's own territory. An emergency on the terri tory where 
the State has a certain limited control must be sufficient. 
5. What Is the Impact of a UN Mandate? 
Normally, the legali ty or illegality of an exercise of jurisdiction does not matter for 
the applicability of IHRl.32 No one denies that human rights most typically apply 
to the most lawful exercise of jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction. The ECtHR held 
that the responsibility of a State also arose "when as a consequence of military ac-
tion-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises effective control of an area outside 
its national terri tory."33 Theoretically, UN Security Council resolutions could, un-
der Article 103 of the UN Charter, prevail over IHRl obligations of States (how-
ever, the extent to which they may do so is controversial). In my view, any 
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derogation from IHRL by the UN Security Council must, however, be explicit. In 
AI-Jedda, the UK House of Lords considered that UN Security Council Resolution 
1546, authorizing "internment where ... necessary for imperative reasons of secu-
rity" qualified the UK's obligations under Article 5 of the ECHR.J4 In my view, the 
wording of this Resolution is not explicit enough to be considered a mandate to 
UN member States not to provide such internees with the procedural guarantees 
they are obliged to offer under IHRL. In any case, the UN Security Council resolu-
tions concerning Afghanistan contain no language similar to that of Resolution 
1546 which could be claimed to govern the admissible reasons of detention. 
In my view, UN Security Council resolutions must be interpreted whenever 
possible in a manner compatible with the rest of international law . The mandate of 
the Security Council to maintain international peace and security includes the au-
thorization of the use offorce. How such force may be used is, however, governed 
by other branches of international law, including IHRL. No one would claim that a 
UN Securi ty Council resolution urging States to prevent acts of terrorism implic-
itly authorizes torture or summary executions. Beyond that, it is often argued that 
even the Security Council must comply with ius cogetls35 and the human rights dis-
cussed here belong to ius cogetts. 
A distinct question relates to situations where foreign forces are participating in 
a peace operation in a way that their acts can be attributed only to the United Na-
tions. A much-criticized recent judgment suggests that in such a case the sending 
State will not have jurisdiction for the purposes of its obligations under human 
rights treaties.)6 Indeed, this judgment runs counter to explicit statements by States 
and to practice.37 In my view, here as elsewhere, everything depends on the facts. It 
may well be that a State contributes troops to a peace operation in such a way that it 
no longer has control over what those troops do and that the exclusive command 
and control is with the UN, with another international organization or with a third 
State. In fact, this is the situation the drafters envisaged in Articles 43-47 ofthe UN 
Charter, which have remained a dead letter. In reality, contributing States retain a 
very large degree of control over their forces. Everyone familiar with ISAF in Af-
ghanistan knows of the national caveats discussed in other contributions to this 
volume. If UN Security Council resolutions and NATO rules allow a contributing 
State to opt out of a certain kind of operation, out of any given operation or out of 
certain methods to implement them, that State has enough control over the acts of 
its own troops to be responsible for their conformity with its human rights obliga-
tions. The case of joint control by a State and an international organization can be 
dealt with similarly to the case of joint control by several States.38 However, a mem-
ber State of an organization has a continuing responsibility to ensure that an 
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organization, to which it delegates conduct that may have implications in terms of 
human rights, complies with the corresponding standards.39 
IV. The Substantive Rules of In ternational Humanitarian Law 
1. On Attacks 
a) The Traditional Answer of Humanitarian Law of International Armed Cotlflids 
In international armed conflicts, members of armed forces belonging to a party to 
the conflict are combatants. Combatants may be attacked at any time until they 
surrender or are otherwise hors de combat, and not only while actually threatening 
the enemy. Combatants are part of the military potential of the enemy and it is 
therefore always lawful to attack them for the purpose of weakening that potential. 
Beside combatants, civilians, too, may be attacked, but only for such time as they 
directly participate in hostilities.40 The traditional understanding is that no rule 
restricts the use offorce against combatants to only those circwnstances when they 
cannot be captured. Within IHL, this view has been challenged based on the princi-
ple of military necessity as a restriction on all violence41 and the prohibition of 
treacherous killings.42 However, neither of these understandings has been translated 
into actual battlefield instructions, and even less into actual battlefield behavior.43 
Even attacks directed at combatants are subject to the proportionality principle, 
but in IHL this principle protects only civilians incidentally affected44 and does not 
require a proportionality evaluation between the harm inflicted on the combatant 
and the military advantage drawn from the attack. The same is true for precaution-
ary measures in attack, which must only be taken for the benefit of the civilian 
population. 
b) The Uncertain Answer of rile Treaty Rules of IHL of Non-international Armed 
Conflicts 
In contradistinction to international armed conflicts, it is not clear under the treaty 
law of non-international armed conflicts when an enemy fighter may be attacked. 
Indeed, neither Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions nor Protocol II refers to 
"combatants" because States did not want to confer on anyone in non-international 
armed confli cts the right to participate in hostilities and the corresponding com-
batant immunity. Those provisions prohibit "violence to life and person, in partic-
ular murder," directed against "persons taking no active part in hostilities," 
including those who have ceased to take part in hostilities.45 Specifically addressing 
the conduct of hostilities, Article 13 of Protocol II prohibits attacks against civilians 
"unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."46 
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One may deduce from these rules, and from the absence of any mention of 
"combatants," that everyone is a civilian in a non-international anned conflict and 
that no one may be attacked unless he or she directly participates in hostilities. 
However, first , it wowd be astonishing that Article 13 uses the term "civilian" in-
stead of a broader term such as "person.".f7 Second, if everyone is a civilian, the 
principle of distinction, which is a fundamental principle ofIHL, becomes mean-
ingless and impossible to apply.48 Third, Common Article 3 confers its protection 
on "persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms or are otherwise hors de combat." The latter part of 
the phrase suggests that for such members of armed forces49 it is not sufficient to 
no longer take an active part in hostilities to be immune from attack. They must 
take additional steps and actively disengage. Fourth, on a more practicalleve!, to 
prohibit government forces from attacking clearly identified fighters unless the lat-
ter engage government forces is militarily unrealistic as it would oblige them to act 
purely reactively while facilitating hit-and-run operations by the rebel group. 
These arguments may therefore lead to the conclusion of the ICRC Commentary to 
Protocol II that "[ t[hose belonging to anned forces or armed groups may be at-
tacked at any time."so 
This conclusion that fighters may be attacked, as in international armed con-
flicts, at any time, until they disengage from the armed group, may be reconciled 
with the text of the treaty provisions in two ways. First, "direct participation in hos-
tilities" can be understood to encompass the simple fac t of remaining a member of 
the groupS] or of keeping a fighting function. 52 Second, fighters can be considered 
not to be "civilians" (benefiting from the protection against attacks unless and for 
such time as they directly participate in hostilities).53 
However, this conclusion raises difficwt questions in practice. How do govern-
ment forces determine membership in an armed group while the individual in 
question does not commit hostile acts? How can membership in the armed group 
be distinguished from simple affiliation with a party to the conflict for which the 
group is fighting-in other words, membership in the political, educational or hu-
manitarian wing of a rebel movement? In my view, one of the most convincing ave-
nues is to allow attacks only against a person who either actually directly 
participates in hostilities or has a function within the armed group to commit acts 
that constitute direct participation in the hostilities.SoI 
c) No Answer Is Provided to the Question by Customary Humanitarian Law 
According to the ICRC study, Customary International Humanitarian Law (JCRC 
Customary Law Study), in both international and non-international armed con-
flicts, "[a[ ttacks may only be directed against combatants. "55 The definition of the 
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term "combatant" offered for non-international armed conflicts makes this rule, 
however, rather circular, ifit simply"indicat[es] persons who do not enjoy the pro-
tection against attacks accorded to civilians . "~ Other rules of that Study indicate 
that "[ c ]ivilians are protected against attack unless and fo r such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities"S7 and civilians are defined as "persons who are not mem-
bers ofthe armed forces. "58 The commentary to the rules must however admit that 
while "State armed forces may be considered combatants ... practice is not clear as 
to the situation of members of armed opposition groups, "59 but rather "ambiguous 
as to whether ... [they] are considered members of armed forces or civilians."60 If 
they are the latter, an imbalance between such groups and governmental armed 
forces could be avoided by considering them to take a direct part in hostilities con-
tinuously.61 Customary law is therefore as ambiguous as the treaty provisions on 
the crucial question whether fighters in non-international armed conflicts may be 
attacked in the same way as combatants in international armed conflicts. 
d) Arguments for and against an Analogous Application of the Rule Applicable in 
International Amled Conflicts 
The general tendency is to bring the law of non-international armed conflicts 
closer to that of international armed conflicts, which has also the positive side ef-
fect of rendering largely moot controversies on whether a given conflict, such as the 
conflict against AI Qaeda in Afghanistan, is international or non-international and 
on what law to apply in conflicts of a mixed nature. In the last twenty years, the juris-
prudence of international criminal tribunals, the influence of human rights law and 
even some treaty rules adopted by States have brought the law of non-international 
armed conflicts closer to the law of international armed conflicts. In the many 
fields where the treaty rules still differ, this convergence has been rationalized by 
claiming that under customary international law, the differences between the two 
categories of conflicts have gradually disappeared. This development has reached 
its provisional acme with the publication of the JCRC Customary Law Study, 
which claims, after ten years of research on "State practice" (in the form of official 
declarations rather than actual behavior), that 136 (and arguably even 141) out of 
161 rules of customary humanitarian law-many of which parallel rules of Proto-
coil , applicable as a treaty to international armed conflicts-apply equally to non-
international armed conflicts.61 Even those who remain skeptical whether State 
practice has truly eliminated the difference to the extent claimed suggest that 
questions not answered by the law of non-international armed conflicts must be 
dealt with by analogy to the law of international armed confl icts, except if the 
very nature of non-international armed conflicts does not allow for such an anal-
ogy (e.g., concerning combatant immunity from prosecution and the concept of 
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occupied terri tories).63 There is, in addition, no real difference between the non-
international armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban today and 
the international armed conflict between those same two parties in 2001. To require 
soldiers in the fo rmer conflicts to capture enemies whenever this is feasible (but not 
in the latter) is unrealistic on the bat tlefield. In addition, the decision when an 
enemy may be shot at must be taken by every soldier on the ground in a split second 
and cannot be left to commanders and courts (as can the decision to intern a per-
son, discussed later). Clear instructions must exist. Whenever possible, the train-
ing of soldiers must be the same in view of international and non-international 
armed conflicts in order to create automatisms that work under the stress of the battle. 
On the other hand, strong argwnents call into question the appropriateness of ap-
plying the same rules as in international armed conflicts. Many non-international 
armed conflicts are fought against or between groups that are not well structured . 
It is much more difficult to determine who belongs to an armed group than who 
belongs to governmental armed forces. Persons join and quit armed groups in an 
informal way, while members in governmental armed forces are incorporated and 
formally dismissed. As armed groups are inevitably illegal, they will do their best 
not to appear as such. Claiming that fighters may be shot at on sight may therefore 
put many civilians in danger/'" whether they are sympathizers of the group, are 
members of the "political wing," belong to the same ethnic group or simply hap-
pen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. In addition, while in international 
armed conflicts a d ear distinction exists between law enforcement by the police 
against civilians and conduct of hostilities by combatants against combatants, 
there is no equ.ivalent clear distinction in non-international armed conflicts. 
In conclusion, neither the rules nor the context of IHL of non-international 
armed conflicts provides a clear answer to the question when an enemy fighter may 
be attacked. 
2. On Detention 
a) The Traditional Answer of Humanitarian Law of International Armed Confiid 
In peacetime as during armed conflict, persons may be detained in view of a trial for a 
crime or based upon conviction of a crime. What is more specific to armed conflicts is 
that enemies may also be interned without criminal charge as a preventative security 
measure. In international armed conflicts this is the essence of prisoner-of-war 
(POW) status. Prisoners of war may be interned without any further procedure 
until the end of active hostili ties.65 IHL equally allows for internment of a civilian 
"if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely nccessary"66 or "for im-
perative reasons of security";67 however, it requires an assessment to determine if a 
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civilian poses a threat to security. Thus, Convention IV mandates procedures to be 
followed for reviewing the internment of civilians, whether they are aliens in the 
territory of a party to the conflict or interned in occupied territory, designating the 
type of review body---either an administrative board or court-and providing for 
appeal and periodic review.68 Finally, it should be noted that unlawful confinement 
is a grave breach of Convention IV.69 
b) Tile Uncertain Answer of Conventional Humanitarian Law of Non-international 
Armed Conj1icts 
Conventional IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict prescribes how 
persons deprived ofliberty for reasons related to the armed conflict must be treated 
and it prescribes judicial guarantees for those who are prosecuted for offenses re-
lating to the conflict (such as individual non-State actor participation in the con-
flict, which always constitutes a crime under the domestic law of the State affected 
by the conflict), but it does not clarify under which circumstances and by which 
procedures a person may be interned for security reasons. Yet the drafters of Proto-
col II recognized the possibility of internment taking place in non-international 
armed conflicts, as demonstrated by the specific reference to internment in Articles 
5 and 6.1° 
c) Customary Humanitarian Law 
According to the lCRC Study, based upon State practice, which obviously cannot be 
divided into practice under IHL, and practice under lHRL, customary IHL prohibits 
the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.71 This rule is interpreted through significant reference to lHRL. 
Applying the two prongs of the principle of legality, the Study states that the basis 
for internment must be previously established by law and stipulates two proce-
dural requirements: ( I ) an "obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the 
reasons for arrest" and (2) an "obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty 
with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention," described as the "so-
called writ of habeas corpus. "72 When trying, as I am attempting to do in this contri-
bution, to determine whether I Hl or I H Rl regulates a certain issue, a "customary 
lHL rule" based on lHRL obviously does not provide a useful starting point for 
determining the lex specialis. 
d) Apply IHL of International Armed Conflicts by Analogy? 
lHL of non-international armed conflicts indicates that internment occurs in non-
international armed conflict,13 but it contains no indication of how it is to be regu-
lated. Such regulation is necessary so that internment can practically take place. 
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One could therefore apply IHL of international armed conflict to non-international 
armed conflicts by way of analogy.74 For members of an armed group with a fight-
ing function captured by international forces in Afghanistan, the closest possible 
analogy with the regulation of international armed conflicts appears to be with 
POWs, who may be detained without any legal procedure until the end of active 
hostili ties.'s The lCRC Customary Law Study indicates the appropriateness of ap-
plying by analogy the standards of Convention III to those designated as "combat-
ants" in non-international armed conflictJ6 Most argwnents in favor of and 
against such an analogy are similar to those mentioned above in relation with the 
admissibility to attack fighters. Some arguments are, however, specific to the de-
tention issue. in favor of POW treatment, it must be mentioned that Article 3 of 
Convention III encourages parties to non-international armed conflicts "to bring 
into force by special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention." If the parties so agree, they could therefore apply the rules of Con-
vention III to fighters, which do not require any individual procedure to decide upon 
the internment. As special agreements to the detriment of war victims are void un-
der IHL,77 application of POW status is therefore not considered as detrimental to 
fighters. Even without an agreement, a government could obtain the same result, 
i.e., POW status of fighters, by resuscitating the concept of recognition of the bel-
ligerency of an armed group, which concept has fallen into disuse?8 
Arguments against this analogy are, first, that upon arrest, as at the moment of 
an attack, it is more difficult to identify fighters than soldiers of armed forces of 
another State. After an attack, an erroneous decision cannot be corrected, because 
either the member of international forces who erroneously did not attack is dead or the 
person who was erroneously attacked is dead. After an arrest, however, the correct 
classification can be made by a tribunal, which will only have its say if the arrested 
person is not classified as a POW.79 Second, while in international armed conflicts 
POWs must be released and repatriated at the end of active hostilities, that moment 
in time is more difficult to determine in a non-international armed conflict80 and 
repatriation is logically impossible in non-international armed conflicts. Even 
when the end of active hostilities is determined, no obligation for a government to 
release rebels at that moment exists in IHL.8l 
It has been suggested elsewhere that even for enemy fighters, the analogy should 
be made with the regime established fo r civilians to be interned for imperative se-
curity reasons rather than with the regime ofPOWs.82 Indeed, the rules applicable 
to international armed conflict generally apply only to protected-person catego-
ries, such as POWs or civilians, while no such categories exist in non-international 
armed conflict and what counts is each individual's conduct. The precise nature of 
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that conduct can only be established through a procedure. We had to admit that 
"the practicality of this approach, however, does not make it legally binding."S3 
v. The Substantive Rules of International Human Rights Law 
1. On Attacks 
Human rights treaties prohibit arbitrary deprivation of life . Most of them do not 
specify when a killing is arbitrary. Only the ECHR specifies that not to be arbitrary, 
the killing must be "absolutely necessary: 
"a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
"b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 
"c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."84 
In its case law, outside of armed conflicts, the ECtHR has admitted the lawfulness 
of killing a person whom authorities genuinely thought was about to detonate a 
bomb, but found the insufficient planning of the operation to violate the right to 
life.&5 By and large, other human rights bodies take the same approach.86 The UN Ba-
sic Principles on the Use of Force and Fireanns by Law Enforcement Officials pro-
vide an authori tative interpretation of the principles authorities must respect when 
using force in order not to infringe the right to life. Those principles limit the use of 
fireanns to cases of self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of 
death or serious injury, of prevention of the perpetration of a particularly serious 
crime involving grave threat to life, of arrest of a person presenting such a danger and 
resisting the law enforcement official's authority, or of prevention of his or her es-
cape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. 
The intentional lethal use of firearms is only admissible "when strictly unavoid-
able in order to protect life. " In addition, law enforcement officials 
shall ... give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the 
warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement 
officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or 
would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circwnstances of the incident.87 
It must however be stressed that the Basic Principles are addressed to officers 
"who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention." Military 
authorities are included, but only if they exercise police powers,88 which could be 
446 
Marco SassOli 
interpreted as meaning, e contrario, that the rules do not bind military authorities 
engaged in the conduct of hostilities. 
Theoretically, IHRL is the same in international, in non-international and out-
side of armed conflicts. The right to life is in addition not subject to derogations, 
except, under the ECHR, in case of "lawful acts ofwar."89 The classic case in which 
a human rights body has assessed the right to life in the context of an anned conflict 
is the Tabfada casco In that case, a group of fighte rs attacked an army base in Argen-
tina. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that "civilians . 
who attacked the Tablada base .. . whether singly or as a member of a group . . . are 
subject to direct individualized attack to tile same extent as combatants" and lose the 
benefit of the proportionality principle and of precautionary measures.90 It then 
exclusively applied IHi (of international armed conflicts ) to those attackers. Only 
civilian bystanders and attackers who surrendered were considered to benefit from 
the right to life . The Commission did not raise the issue whether the fighters should 
have been arrested rather than killed whenever possible. 
In the Guerrero case, the Human Rights Committee found Colombia to have ar-
bitrarily deprived persons who were suspected-but even by the subsequent en-
quiry not proven-to be kidnappers and members of a "guerrilla organization" of 
their right to life. The police waited for the suspected kidnappers in the house 
where they had believed the victim of a kidnapping to be held, but which they 
found empty. When the suspected kidnappers arrived, they were shot without 
warning, without being given an opportunity to surrender and despite the fact that 
none of the kidnappers had fired a shot, but simply tried to flee.91 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR in cases involving the right to life in the non-
international armed conflict in Chechnya includes statements which appear to re-
quire that in the planning and execution of even a lawful action against fighters, 
any risk to life and the use of lethal force must be minimized.92 These statements 
were not limited to the protection of the lives of civilians, but the actual victims in 
the case were civilians. In all other cases in which human rights bodies and the ICJ 
applied the right to life in armed conflicts not of an international character, the 
persons killed were either liars de combat or not alleged to have been fighters.'B 
However, fighters are very often killed, e.g., bombed, while they are not hors de 
combat. Nevertheless, no such case has been brought before an international hu-
man rights monitoring body. Some observers have deduced from the absence of 
any such case law that such killings do not violate the right to life, a case being 
brought before the Inter-American system by a surviving relative of a FARC mem-
ber being "unthinkable. "94 
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The limited body of case law is thus not really conclusive on the question as to 
what IHRL requires from government authorities using force against fighters. but 
there is no clear indication that the principles applicable in peacetime do not apply. 
2. On Detention 
Human rights provisions regulating deprivation of liberty can be found in a vari-
ety of different treaties that stipulate that a person may only be deprived ofliberty 
"on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by 
law."95 All treaties prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention,96 but only Article 5 of the 
ECHR specifically and exhaustively enumerates the admissible reasons for depriving 
a person ofhis/her liberty. Besides conviction, education of minors, mental illness. 
drug addiction. vagrancy and immigration control, these include (in Article 
5(1)(c)) not only detention on remand. but also. as an alternative. instances 
"when [the detention I is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his commit-
ting an offence .... " Under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. the latter alternat ive 
could be seen as implicitly allowing for internment. i.e., administrative detention. 
to hinder an individual from committing a concrete and specific offence.9? In that 
situation, however, the person must also be brought (under Article 5(3)) 
"promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending 
triar' (emphasis added). Therefore, a majority of writers conclude that article 
5(1)(c) covers only detention in the framework of criminal proceedings and there-
fore does not allow internment (except in a state of emergency).911 The jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR is however not clear on this issue and certain obiter dicta seem 
to indicate the contrary.99 
The ICCPR does not mention specific reasons justifying internment. but re-
quires in Article 9(1 ) that. even when all other conditions are fulfilled. the intern-
ment not be arbitrary. The Human Rights Committee underlines that "[ t lhe 
drafting history ... confirms that 'arbitrariness' is not [simply] to be equated with 
'against the law', but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of in-
appropriateness, injustice. lack of predictabili ty and due process oflaw."loo The ar-
rest and detention must be reasonable and necessary. WI 
Internment of enemy fighters would therefore certainly be admissible even 
without a trial under the ICCPR, while the jury is still out for the ECHR. Under 
both instruments. however. two procedures must be complied with for a person to 
be lawfully deprived of his/her liberty. First, an arrested person must be promptly 
informed of the reasons for arrest. iOl Second. any person deprived of liberty "shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court m ay decide 
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without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the deten-
tion is not lawful."103 
As such, the right to personal freedom is subject to possible derogations in case 
of a situation threatening the life of the nation, if such derogation is necessary to 
face the situation, is proportionate to the threat and is not incompatible with other 
international obligations of the derogating State (such as, in case of armed conflict, 
obligations stemming from IHL). Furthermore, the derogation must be officially 
declared and communicated to the other State parties to the treaty from which a 
State wishes to derogate. In addition, under the ICCPR, the derogation may not 
lead to or consist of discrimination on inadmissible grounds. Under the American 
Convention on Human Rights, judicial guarantees essential for the protection of 
non-derogable rights may not be subject to derogations. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has therefore found that the access to habeas corpus and 
amparo proceedings are non-derogable rights.104 Similarly, the Human Rights 
Committee considers that the right to have any arrest be controlled by a judicial 
body may never be derogated from because it constitutes a necessary mechanism of 
enforcement for such non-derogable rights as the prohibition of inhumane and 
degrading treatment and the right to life. !Os The ECtHR accepted in the past that 
certain violations of the right to a judicial remedy, provided for in Article 5(4) 
ECHR, were covered by the right to derogation under Article IS, ECHRYl6 It is 
however submitted that the Court would not necessarily decide so today, as inter-
national practice shown above has since developed toward recognizing the non-
derogable nature of habeas corpus. As a possible first step in this direction, the 
Court held that a period of fourteen days before being brought before a judicial au-
thority, together with lack of access to a lawyer and inability to communicate with 
family and friends, was contrary to the Convention despite a derogation by the 
State concerned. 107 As for customary IHRL, it is widely claimed that the right to ha-
beas corpus is non-derogable. 108 
VI. What Prevails If Both IHL and IHRL Apply? 
Ifboth IHL and IHRL apply and provide differing answers in a given situation, the 
lex specialis principle determines which of the two prevails. II)'} It must however be 
stressed that if (for whatever reason) one of the two branches does not apply to cer-
tain conduct, no lex specialis issue arises. Thus, if the United States is correct in con-
sidering that IHRL does not apply extraterritorially or if IHRL does not create 
obligations for armed groups, as the prevailing opinion goes,110 their conduct is 
governed exclusively by IHL. 
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1. The Determination of the Lex Spedalis 
J have tried elsewhere to explore what the principle "lex specialis derogat legi 
generali" means in general and in particular concerning JHL and IHRL.lll The 
principle does not indicate an inherent quality in one branch of law orof one of its 
rules. Rather, it determines which rule prevails over another in a particular situa-
tion.ll2 Each case must be analyzed individually.]]) 
Several factors must be weighed to determine which rule, in relation to a certain 
problem, is special. Specialty in the sense of logic implies that the norm that applies 
to certain facts must give way to the norm that applies to those same fac ts as well as 
to an additional fact present in the given situation. Between two applicable rules, 
the one which has the larger "common contact surface area" 1l4 with the situation 
applies. The norm with the scope of application that enters completely into that of 
the other nonn must prevail, otherwise it would never apply. lIS It is the norm with 
the more precise or narrower material and/or personal scope of application that 
prevails. 116 Precision requires that the norm addressing explicitly a problem pre-
vails over the one that treats it implicitly, the one providing the advantage of detail 
over the other's generality,l17 and the more restrictive norm over the one covering 
the entire problem but in a less exacting manner. lll1 
A less formal factor-and equally less objective-that permits determination of 
which of two rules apply is the conformity of the solution to the systemic objectives 
of the law. 11 9 Characterizing this solution as "lex specialis" perhaps constitutes mis-
use of language. The systemic order of international law is a nonnative postulate 
founded upon value judgments. 120 In particular when formal standards do not in-
dicate a clear result, this teleological criterion must weigh in, even though it allows 
for personal preferences.121 
The principle traditionally deals with antinomies between conventional rules. 
Whether it also applies to the relationship between two customary rules is less 
clear. Theoretically, this is not the case, if one adopts a traditional understanding of 
customary law. The customary rule applicable to a certain problem derives from 
the practice and opinio juris of States in relation to that problem. In relation to the 
same problem, there cannot be a customary "IHRL" and another customary "IHL» 
rule. One always focuses on the practice and the opinio juris manifested in relation 
to problems as similar as possible to the one to be resolved. This appears to be the 
approach of the JCRC, which refers, in its Customary Law Study, to a vast array of 
practice in human rights, including outside of armed conflicts.122 In practice, how-
ever, when one looks for a customary rule, one often refers to a text, whether a 
treaty or another instrument codifying customary law or one that instigated the de-
velopment of a customary rule, 123 or even a doctrinal text. Then, one specific prob-
lem could be covered by two contradictory texts, both deduced from State practice. 
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The choice between these tw"o texts is, in my opinion, governed by the same princi-
ples as the choice between two treaty rules. If the State practice clarifying which of 
the two rules prevails in the given situation is not sufficiently dense, one must dis-
cover by the usual methods which of the two rules. derived from the practice ana-
lyzed from different perspectives, constitutes the lex specialis. 
2. On Attacks 
First, it must be emphasized that there is a good deal of common ground between 
IHL and IHRL. In a "battlefield-like" situation. arrest is virtually always impossible 
without putting the government forces into disproportionate danger. A fighter 
presents a great threat to life even if that threat consists of attacks against armed 
forces. The immediacy of that threat might be based not only on what the targeted 
fighter is expected to do, but also on his or her previous behavior. 124 Therefore, 
even under lHRL, in such situations. lethal force could be used. On the other hand. 
the life of a fighter who is hors de combat is equally protected by both branches. 
It is where the solutions of the tw"o branches actually contradict each other that 
the applicable rule must be determined under the lexspecialis principle. The quint-
essential example of such a contradiction is the Taliban or AI Qaeda leader attend-
ing a secret meeting in Kabul. Many interpret IHL as permitting international 
forces to shoot to kill since he is a fighter. but this is controversial. IHRL would 
clearly say he must be arrested and a graduated use offorce must be employed, but 
this conclusion is based upon precedents which arose in peacetime and IHRL is al-
ways more flexible according to the situation. 
In my view. some situations contain more specificities of the situation for which 
the IHL rule was made and some situations more facts for which hwnan rights 
were typically made. There is a sliding scalel25 between the lone Taliban leader in 
Kabul and the Taliban fighter engaged in a nearly conventional battle with interna-
tional forces in the mountains around Khost. It is impossible to provide a "one size 
fits all" answer; as shown above. the lex specialis principle does not determine pri-
orities between tw"o rules in the abstract, but offers a solution to a concrete case in 
which competing rules lead to different results. The famous dictum by the ICI that 
"[ t ]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life .. . [must] be determined by the 
applicable lexspecialis. namely. the law applicable in armed conflict"12& should not 
be misunderstood. It has to be read in the context of the opinion, J27 in which the 
IC] had to determine the legality in abstracto of the use of a certain weapon. 
Such a flexible solution. which makes the actual required behavior depend upon 
the situation at hand, is dangerous. in particular regarding attacks, where it literally 
deals with a question of life and death and where it has to be applied by eve!)' sol-
dier and leads to irreversible results. It is therefore indispensable to determine 
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factors which make either the IHL of international anned conflicts rule or the 
IHRL rule prevail. 
The existence and extent of control by governmental and international forces 
over the placel28 where the attack occurs point toward IHRL as lex specialis. 129 Even 
ifI HRL obligations under the right to life existed for a given State beyond territory 
that is under the control of that State, control over the place where the attack occurs 
is a factor making IH RL prevail over IH L. The latter was made for hostilities against 
forces on or beyond the front line, i.e., in a place that is not under the control of 
those who attack them, while law enforcement concerns persons who are under the 
jurisdiction of those who act. In traditional conflict situations this corresponds to 
the question of how remote the situation is from the battlefield,l30 although fewer 
and fewer contemporary conflicts are characterized by front lines and battlefields. 
What then constitutes sufficient control to warrant IHRL predominating as the lex 
specialis? International forces could not simply argue that the presence of a solitary 
rebel or even a group of rebels indicates that in fact they are not fully in control of 
the place and therefore act under IHL as lex specialis. The question is rather one of 
degree. If the international forces could effect an arrest (of a member of the 
Taliban) without being overly concerned about interference by other Taliban in 
that operation, then they have sufficient control over the place to make human 
rights prevail as lex specialis. 
This criterion of control leaves the solution a li ttle more open in an area that is 
under firm control of neither side (such as many places in Afghanistan). Even 
where the strict requirements of necessity of lHRL are not fulfilled (if they are, both 
branches lead to the same result), the impossibility of arresting the fighter,l3l the 
danger inherent in an attempt to arrest the fighter)ll and the danger represented by 
the fighter for government and international forces and civilians as well as the im-
mediacy of this danger))) may lead to the concl usion that IHL is the lex specia1is in 
that situation. These factors are interlinked with the elements of control described 
above. In addition, where neither party has clear geographical control, in my view, 
the higher the degree of certainty that the target is actually a fighter, the easier the 
IHL approach appears as lex specialis.):l-l Attacks are lawful against persons who are 
actually figh ters, while law enforcement is by definition directed against suspects. 
The main weakness of such a fl exible approach is its practicability. If the answer 
depends on the specific situation, how can a soldier know what to apply? This 
problem can only be solved by precise instructions and orders for every operation 
and every sortie. In addition , on the international level, guidelines might be devel-
oped in discussions among IHL and IHRL experts, law enforcement practitioners 
and representatives of the military. Logically, (former) fighters should also be 
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involved, in particular if the guidelines equally cover conduct of such groups, us to 
ensure that they can be applied in practice. 
3. On Detention 
When comparing the rules of IHL of non-international armed conflicts on proce-
dural guarantees for persons arrested with those ofIHRL, the former do not exist 
while, except for the admissible extent of derogations, the latter are dear and well 
developed by jurisprudence. The latter must therefore prevail. They are more pre-
cise and more restrictive. The lCRC Customary Law Study appears to adopt this 
approach when it interprets the alleged IHL rule prohibiting the arbitrary depriva-
tion of liberty through the lens of lHRL. H6 Unlike a person to be targeted, for 
whom a flexible approach was advocated above, a detainee is dearly under control 
of those who detain him or her. It may be added that the result is not so different 
from that of an application by analogy of the guarantees foreseen by Convention 
IV for civilians in international armed conflicts, the only difference being that un-
der IHRL a court must decide, while under IHL an administrative body is suffi-
cient.i37 Under IHRL too, however, the court does not necessarily have to be a fully 
independent and impartial tribunal that could try a person, but it must have a judi-
cial character and it may only take decisions after judicial, adversarial proceedings 
providing the individual guarantees appropriate to the reasons of the internment 
in question. 
The only exception where IHL must prevail, as it was specifically made for 
armed conflicts and foresees a rule, exists when either an agreement between the 
parties or a unilateral recognition of belligerency makes the full regime of POWs 
applicable. In that case detained fighters have the disadvantage of a lack of access to 
habeas corpus (although there must inevitably exist a procedure to determine 
whether an arrested person is or is not an enemy fighter benefiting from POW 
status), but they have the advantage of a detailed regime governing their detention, 
of immunity against prosecution and of a right to be released at the end of active 
hostilities. In relation to Afghanistan, the question arises whether the agreements 
concluded by certain coalition partners such as Canada with the Afghan govern-
ment in which both parties undertake to "treat detainees in accordance with the 
standards set out in the Third Geneva Convention"u8 can be considered as a uni-
lateral granting of the protection of Convent ion III, which would make lHL prevail 
over the IHRL procedural guarantees. According to the letter of those agreements, 
this is the case, at least for persons who are actually detained by the Afghan authori-
ties. In reality, however, it would be very astonishing if, through those agreements, 
the Afghan government waived the right to prosecute those arrested for acts ofhos-
tility against their forces, which is part of POW status. Nongovernmental 
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organization reports rather indicate that even the treatment of those persons is far 
from what Convention III would require.13~ In my view, only full POW status may 
offer a lex specialis compared with the detailed procedural guarantees of IHRL. 
The main difficulty with this approach too is whether it is realistic to expect 
States and non-State actors, interning possibly thousands, to bring all internees be-
fore a court without delay during armed conflict. If it is not, such an obligation 
risks making it extremely difficult to conduct war effectively and, thus, could lead 
to less compliance with the rules in the long term, e.g., summary executions dis-
guised as battlefield killings. 
A second concern derives from the differences between State and non-State ac-
tors, which have equal obligations under IHL but not under IHRL. The question of 
whether a non-State actor may establish a court remains controversiaL 140 The re-
quirements that there be a legal basis and procedures established by law for intern-
ment raise the same concern. While human rights themselves stipulate at least two 
procedural requirements, neither they nor IHL applicable to non-international 
armed conflict provides a specific legal basis for internment. While a State can so 
provide in its domestic law, how is the non-State actor to establish this basis in law? 
Could then a non-State actor also derogate from IHRL? Application ofIHRL seems 
to make it impossible for one party to the armed conflict-the non-State actor-to 
intern legally. Parties to armed conflicts intern persons, hindering them from con-
tinuing to bear arms, so as to gain the military advantage. If the non-State actor 
cannot legally intern persons-recalling that it is a serious violation ofIHl to deny 
quarter l41-the non-State actor is left with little option but to release the captured 
enemy fighters. If rules applicable to armed conflict make efficient fighting impos-
sible, they will not be respected, thus undermining any protection the law provides. 
These may be reasons for not applying the same lex specialis reasoning to armed 
groups even if IHRL were considered to bind non-State armed groups. 
VII. Conclusion 
In an ideal world, armed forces could apply one set of rules when abroad, they 
would always know who a person they are confronted with is, they would deal un-
der IHL with enemy fighters, while the Afghan police would deal in full respect of 
IHRL with everyone else. This ideal world does not exist, and even less so in Afghan-
istan. It is the very essence of stability operations that they take place in an environ-
ment which offers the full spectrum of situations. It is therefore not astonishing but 
in fact normal that the full spectrum of laws apply: IHL, made for anned conflicts 
but leaving some questions open, in particular in non-international armed con-
flicts; IHRl, made for the relations between a State and its citizens, but also 
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applicable to (or at least containing values that must protect) foreigners and people 
confronted with agents of a State abroad; and the domestic law of the territorial 
State and of the home State. It is also normal that there is no general answer on how 
those laws interrelate and which prevails. Everything depends on where on the 
spectrwn a certain encounter with local people is situated. Most often, in addition, 
the soldier acting in the field, and even the commander responsible for a detention, 
does not know where on the spectrum he or she is standing. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between IHL and IHRL for international forces in Afghanistan depends 
on many variables, and the identity and weight of those variables are in addition 
controversial among lawyers. The approach suggested here as to when and whether 
an Afghan may be attacked and detained like a soldier of the German Wehrmacht 
in World War 1I and when he or she must benefit from the guarantees benefiting in 
peacetime even the most suspect person lurking in a dodgy neighborhood is based 
upon the fundamental ideas and the typical situations for which the two branches 
were made. Moreover, it takes into account the practical difficulties of decision 
making and the risks, consequences and reversibility of mistakes in that decision 
making, for both the target and the member of the international forces . If the security 
of the international forces were the overriding consideration, they would not be 
sent by their governments to such a dangerous place as Afghanistan. Victory does 
not mainly depend upon their military superiority, but on the impression they 
leave with the Afghan population, compared with what their enemies have to offer. 
Many will consider the very nuanced line suggested in this article, which in 
addition on some important issues is unable to provide solutions and only lists ar-
guments, as unrealistic. In my view, full-spectrum operations require soldiers at an 
increasingly lower level to apply, simultaneously, complicated and controversial 
rules. However, they are not and they should not be left alone. They need the best 
possible training and clear instructions for every sortie. In addition, international 
lawyers and practitioners should meet, not to reaffirm the theory or to conclude 
that the old rules are not adequate for the new situation, but to operationalize the 
interplay between the existing rules agreed upon by States, including to explain the 
few issues on which there are genuine divergences of view, the (often rather lim-
ited) practical impact of those divergences and the possible solutions. 
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